GIT security model

Git, SHA1 and security
Is the GIT security model dependent on the cryptographic security of the hashing algorithm (SHA1) used by git to generate id's for GIT objects?
After new progresses last year in breaking the SHA1 algorithm, it is reasonable to try to find an answer to this question before deciding to adopt GIT for your software project(s). This was the subject of an interesting discussion I recently had with some colleagues.
There's an interesting post by Linus Torvalds on the  on the Cryptography Mailing List  about this subject, dated 25 Apr. 2005.
Basically it would be very difficult for an an attacker, leveraging the possibility to generate a collision in order to corrupt a GIT object database, to produce huge harms because the GIT security model is NOT based on the cryptographic security of the SHA1 hash, but on the fact that (in Linus' words)"git is distributed, which means that a developer should never actually use a public tree for his development".
And, of course, the possibility of corrupting all the existing repositories of all users involved in a project, without anybody noticing it, is quite remote.
The adoption of SHA1: a design flaw?
Even if we do not consider the adoption of SHA1 an issue by the point of view of security (i.e., we agree that that the weakness of the SHA1 algorithm does not make life easier for attackers who wants compromise the integrity of a GIT archive), still this could be considered a design flaw, since the id's for objects are not deterministically unique, but only probabilistically. My opinion? The probability of collisions of two files in a software project using SHA1 is so low that this will never be a concrete issue for GIT users (thanks to Luca Milanesio, Peter Moore and Stefano Galarraga for your input).